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Privacy Goes to the Dogs
Steve Coughlan*
It becomes increasingly clear, with the decision of the Newfoundland Court of
Appeal in R. v. Taylor, ante, that the question of whether police use of sniffer
dogs constitutes a search, and if so when, will need to be addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. In particular the question of whether R. v. Tessling1 has
changed the approach to reasonable expectation of privacy as dramatically as
some courts have suggested must be settled. Other questions will also need to be
addressed.
Targeted Investigations vs Speculative Sweeps
The first Court of Appeal to address the sniffer dog issue after Tessling was
Ontario's, in R. v. M. (A.).2 In that case a sniffer dog had been used to do a
general sweep of a school, and had detected the smell of drugs while sniffing a
group of backpacks in the gymnasium. The court found this to be an unreasonable search, but offered only a very brief analysis of the effect of Tessling. They
held that there was a significant difference between using a FLIR to detect heat
patterns of a particular building about which there were suspicions and the use
of a dog to randomly sniff at the belongings of an entire student body, and accordingly found the use of the dog to have been a search.
In R. v. Brown? in contrast, a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal overturned its own previous decision in R. v. Dinh,4 that the use of a sniffer dog was
a search. They held that the reasoning in Tessling undermined the basis of the
reasoning in R. v. Dinh, and accordingly that the particular use of the dog in that
case, at a bus station to sniff at the luggage of passengers as they were in the
terminal,5 was not a search.
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See David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at pp. 91-94 for
a discussion of Operation Pipeline, the RCMP program which has led to many of these
broad sweep investigations at bus stations and similar locations. He notes that this pro-
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The most recent case, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal's decision in Taylor,
occupies something of a middle ground between these two cases. It does adopt
much of the reasoning in Brown, in particular that case's understanding of the
reasoning in Tessling. On the other hand, it also notes as of significance that the
investigation in this case was aimed at a particular package because of information already obtained about that package: that is, the facts were analogous to the
FLIR search in Tessling, and not analogous to the "speculative sweeps" in both
M. (A.) and Brown. The court stops short of deciding that this difference creates
a clear dividing line between searches and non-searches, leaving that issue for
another day, but it does state that:
there is considerable tension between the type of speculative sweep used in
Gosse, McCarthy and Brown, and Justice Dickson's assertion of "the public's interest in being left alone by government" in Canada (Director of
Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam Inc.^

The middle ground created by Taylor is useful for recognizing that the issue of
sniffer dogs is a complex one. In some ways, though, the distinction suggested
in the case is counter-intuitive.
From a policy perspective it is correct, as Taylor implies, that the widespread
and standardless use of a police investigative technique is more objectionable
and more damaging to privacy interests than the occasional use of that technique
against a particular individual who is already under suspicion. We might wish to
guard against both, but it is probably more important to guard against the former. That said, at an intuitive level, to make a single individual the specific
target of a particular method of investigation because of pre-existing suspicions
about that individual seems more like something which should be described as a
"search" than does a technique applied randomly to a widespread group about
whom there are no particular suspicions. Of course both might well be aptly
described as searches: no one would suggest that checking everyone's pockets,
backpacks, purses, and so on as they entered a courthouse was not a search because it was done without individualized suspicions. Still, at least to this observer, the former seems even more like a search.
This observation leads to a second point which needs to be addressed: that the
threshold step of "reasonable expectation of privacy" is not the most appropriate
stage at which to balance the competing interests involved.

gram was adopted by the RCMP based on methods used in the U.S. which expressly
include racial profiling.
^Taylor, ante, para 36.
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Reasonable Expectation of Privacy as a Threshold
The best method of creating protections against speculative sweeps but permitting some targeted investigations is not at the "reasonable expectation of privacy" stage of the Charter analysis. At that threshold stage, the analytical approach which has been created only allows courts to say either that a particular
investigative technique was a search (and so is subject to the Charter rules) or
was not a search (and so can be completely unregulated). A discussion focussing
around any of the questions of whether the search was reasonable, or whether
the unreasonable search was justified in a free and democratic society, or
whether the evidence obtained from the unreasonable search should nonetheless
be admitted would permit a much more direct and careful balancing of the competing interests than the "on/off approach allowed by the light switch analysis
of reasonable expectation of privacy.7
This point was made to, but was not really addressed by, the Supreme Court in
Tessling: the accused pointed out that:
if the Crown is correct that what was done with FLIR technology in this case
is not a s. 8 search, it would follow that the police are at liberty to take 'heat
pictures' of homes and other shelters whenever they wish, targeting whomever they wish, without any prior judicial authorization.8

The Court acknowledged the truth of this statement, but in reply merely adopted
the view of the minority of the United States Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United
States that "public officials should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain".9
As Paperny J.A. pointed out in dissent in Brown, that position from Kyllo misses
the point: "[t]he statement is that public officials need not turn a blind eye, a
concept distinct from searching out emissions without authorization".10 It is perfectly reasonable, for example, for police to rely on the smell of alcohol on a
driver's breath or in a stopped vehicle as part of a justification for making a
breathalyser or ALERT demand. But one cannot reason from that fact to the
conclusion that other methods of investigating the driver or car, such as the use
of an alcohol detection wand to find quantities of alcohol in the air that are not
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discoverable by the human nose, would not constitute a search. Not averting
one's senses is quite distinct from deliberately training one's investigative technology (including a sniffer dog's nose) on a particular suspect to detect the otherwise undetectable.
The Supreme Court rejected in Tessling the notion (relied on in Kyllo, by the
court below in Tessling, and in Lam) that a distinction should be drawn based on
whether a particular piece of technology is in common use or not: so that, for
example, the use of a FLIR to look at a house would be a search but the use of
binoculars would be merely observation. The Court's conclusion that this concept is vague and that a reliable test for "general public use" would be too difficult to create seems correct." Still, even if that criterion is not workable as a
single touchstone for deciding when a particular technique becomes a search, it
might be helpful as one among a group of other considerations. "Emissions in
the public domain" captures a great many things, some of which (it follows from
Tessling) are public despite not being detectable in an unaided fashion: people
and their possessions emit not only smells and heat, but sounds, vibrations, photons, pheromones and other chemicals, electromagnetic waves and other forms
of radiation, and other things. 12 A test which acknowledged that a person walking down the street and blowing smoke from a marijuana cigarette into a police
officer's face is making emissions in a way noticeably different from someone
who has a triple-wrapped bag of marijuana in the locked trunk of a car, and
which recognized that there is a wide range of potential "emitting" in between,
would be helpful. Not every use of any technological aid should turn an observation into a search: if that were so, police officers and others with less than perfect vision would be searching whenever they wore glasses. The "general public
use" test was one attempt to distinguish when the use of technology crossed over
the line from observation to search. Rejecting that test as unworkable does not
mean that some test as to when a use of technology to detect otherwise undetectable "public" emissions becomes a search would not be useful.
Both Taylor and Brown, it should be said, are aware of this need. Each case is
careful to state that it is not laying down a rule about all dog-sniffing cases, and
that other results might flow on other facts. An analytical framework creating
some consistency and predictability in what types of facts might lead to particular results, though, has yet to be developed: evidenced, if by nothing else, in the
competing conclusions in Brown, Taylor and M. (A.) as to what result should

Tessling, note 1, para. 58.
'2See Renee M. Pomerance, "Shedding Light on the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in
the wake of R. v. Tessling" (2005), 23 C.R. (6th) 229 at 236: "fw]e emit DNA from our
physical persons on a relatively constant basis, just as heat is constantly emitted from our
houses. These 'DNA emissions' are neither conscious nor voluntary. Are they to be
treated the same way as heat?".

follow in "speculative sweep" situations. 13 And no matter what framework is
adopted, the hard fact that a finding of no reasonable expectation of privacy
leads to a complete lack of regulation means that the threshold must be set low.
As noted above, it is for this reason that a nuanced balancing test is more easily
created at a later stage.
Searching for Illegal Activity
One other aspect of the reasoning in Taylor, which is taken from Brown, should
be noted. Both cases consider that what is at stake is informational privacy. The
particular information discovered was that the accused had a narcotic, which,
each court held, was not part of the "biographical core of personal information"
that s. 8 was meant to protect. The reasoning on this point seems inconsistent
with the approach to reasonable expectation of privacy laid down by the Supreme Court in R. v. Wong.14
In Wong, the police had used a hidden camera to conduct surveillance of a hotel
room rented by the accused, in which he conducted illegal gambling. The Supreme Court stressed that the nature of the activity ought not to enter into the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis:
It would be an error to suppose that the question that must be asked is
whether persons who engage in illegal activity behind the locked door of a
hotel room have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, the question
must be framed in broad and neutral terms: in a society such as ours, do
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have a
reasonable expectation of privacy?
The approach of Taylor and Brown seems to contradict this. Those cases hold:
... The relevant question is not whether counterfeiters or fences or drug
smugglers have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the tools, merchandise or fruits of their trade. The first question is whether the ordinary citizen
who has committed no offence has a reasonable expectation of privacy
which would be significantly invaded by the police action in question here.
The danger of the police rifling through homes or suitcases is not so much
their finding illegal items like guns, but their seeing legal intimate or personal items. So here one must first ask whether there would have been a
"search" under s. 8 if the appellant had had no illegal narcotics in his
luggage.

^Pomerance, note 12, at 233 observes that "the present regime resembles more of a
guessing game."
141990
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In my view ... there would not. The dog could detect 9 types of illegal drugs,
and nothing else. Had the appellant had none of the 9 illegal drugs, the dog
sniff would have had no effect. Innocent items such as medicine, food, or
perfume, even illegal money or burglary tools or smuggled cigarettes or
guns, would have gone undetected. ...'^

[bold emphasis in the original, underlining added]
This reasoning seems straightforwardly to say "because the police only tried to
detect illegal items in the package, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy". Equally straightforwardly, that is contrary to Wong's direction that the
illegal nature of the activity should not enter into the analysis. The fact that the
sniffer dog's nose could only detect narcotics, not intimate but legal items,
might perhaps make the search unobtrusive, which ought to enter into the Charter analysis at some point. However, the fact that it could only detect illegal
activity should not mean that this method of examination was not a search at all.

'^Rowe J.A. in Taylor, ante, para. 23, quoting Cote J.A. in Brown, paras. 17, 18.

